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(57) ABSTRACT 
Systems and methods of providing opportunistic security for 
physical communication channels are disclosed. One dis-
closed method is for opportunistic secure communication on 
a main channel between a sender device and a receiver device 
when an eavesdropper device is listening on an eavesdropper 
channel. This example method includes transmitting, in a first 
time period in which signal quality on the main channel is 
better than signal quality on the eavesdropper channel, sym-
bols that are randomly selected from a set of symbols. The 
method also includes transmitting, in a second time period in 
which signal quality on the main channel is not better than 
signal quality on the eavesdropper channel, coding informa-
tion associated with the randomly selected symbols. The 
method also includes reconciling the randomly selected sym-
bols using the coding information. 
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SYSTEMS AND METHODS FOR PROVIDING 
OPPORTUNISTIC SECURITY FOR 
PHYSICAL COMMUNICATION CHANNELS 
CROSS REFERENCE TO RELATED 
APPLICATIONS 
2 
FIG. 6 is a block diagram of the multilevel coder and 
encoder used by some embodiments of the logic for providing 
opportunistic security for physical communication channels 
from FIG. 1. 
FIG. 7 is a diagram illustrating a timeline for generating 
and using multiple keys over time. 
This application is the National Stage of International 
Application No. PCT/US2007/078734 filed Sep. 18, 2007, 
which claims the benefit of U.S. Provisional Application No. 10 
60/845,415 filed Sep. 18, 2006, which are hereby incorpo-
rated by reference in their entirety. 
FIG. 8 is a hardware block diagram of the device from FIG. 
1. 
SUMMARY 
Systems and methods of providing opportunistic security 
for physical communication channels are disclosed. One dis-
closed method is for opportunistic secure communication on 
FIELD OF THE DISCLOSURE 
The present disclosure relates to data communication, and 
more specifically, to opportunistic security for communica-
tion channels. 
BACKGROUND 
The conventional method of providing secure communica-
tion over a channel uses cryptography. Cryptography relies 
on the existence of codes that are "hard to break": that is, 
one-way functions that are believed to be computationally 
infeasible to invert. Therefore, cryptography is vulnerable to 
15 a main channel between a sender device and a receiver device 
when an eavesdropper device is listening on an eavesdropper 
channel. This example method includes transmitting, in a first 
time period in which signal quality on the main channel is 
better than signal quality on the eavesdropper channel, sym-
20 bols that are randomly selected from a set of symbols. The 
method also includes transmitting, in a second time period in 
which signal quality on the main channel is not better than 
signal quality on the eavesdropper channel, coding informa-
tion associated with the randomly selected symbols. The 
25 method also includes reconciling the randomly selected sym-
bols using the coding information. 
One disclosed system is for opportunistic secure commu-
an increase in computing power a, the development of more 
efficient attacks. Furthermore, the assumptions about the 
hardness of certain one-way functions have not been proven 30 
mathematically, so cryptography is vulnerable if these 
nication on a main channel between a sender device and a 
receiver device when an eavesdropper device is listening on 
an eavesdropper channel. This example system includes 
means for transmitting, in a first time period in which signal 
assumptions are incorrect. 
Another weakness of cryptography is the lack of no precise 
metrics or absolute comparisons between various crypto-
graphic algorithms, showing the trade off between reliability 
and security as a function of the block length of plaintext and 
ciphertext messages. Instead, a particular cryptographic algo-
rithm is considered "secure" if it survives a defined set of 
attacks, or "insecure" if it does not. 
Cryptography as applied to some media (e.g., wireless 
networks) also requires a trusted third party as well as com-
plex protocols and system architectures. Therefore, a need 
exists for these and other problems to be addressed. 
BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS 
Many aspects of the disclosure can be better understood 
with reference to the following drawings. The components in 
the drawings are not necessarily to scale, emphasis instead 
being placed upon clearly illustrating the principles of the 
present disclosure. 
quality on the main channel is better than signal quality on the 
eavesdropper channel, symbols that are randomly selected 
from a set of symbols. The system also includes means for 
35 transmitting, in a second time period in which signal quality 
on the main channel is not better than signal quality on the 
eavesdropper channel, coding information associated with 
the randomly selected symbols. The system also includes 
means for reconciling the randomly selected symbols using 
40 the coding information. 
Another disclosed method is for opportunistic secure com-
munication on a main channel between a sender device and a 
receiver device when an eavesdropper device is listening on 
an eavesdropper channel. This example method includes 
45 transmitting, in a first time period, symbols that are randomly 
selected from a set of symbols. The method also includes 
transmitting, in a second time period, coding information 
associated with the randomly selected symbols. The method 
also includes reconciling the randomly selected symbols 
50 using the coding information. The first and second time peri-
ods are distinguished by relative signal quality on the main 
channel and on the eavesdropper channel. 
FIG. 1 is a block diagram of an environment in which one 
embodiment of a system and method for providing opportu-
nistic security for physical communication channels is 55 
located. 
Another system is for opportunistic secure communication 
on a main channel between a sender device and a receiver 
device when an eavesdropper device is listening on an eaves-
dropper channel. This system includes a physical layer com-
ponent and a higher-than-physical-layer component. The 
physical layer is configured to distill a key from symbols and 
coding information that are presented on the main channel 
FIG. 2. is a block diagram of the channel between the 
sender device and the receiver device from FIG. 1, at the 
physical layer. 
FIG. 3 is a graph of signal quality, over time, on the main 
channel and the eavesdropper channel from FIG. 1. 
FIG. 4 is a sequence diagram of one embodiment of the 
logic for providing opportunistic security for physical com-
munication channels from FIG. 1. 
60 during two different time periods. The higher-than-physical-
layer component is configured to encrypt using the distilled 
key. The two different time periods are distinguished by rela-
tive signal quality on the main channel and on the eavesdrop-
per channel. 
FIGS. SA-E are block diagrams illustrating an example 65 
scenario with the sender, the receiver, and the eavesdropper 
from FIG. 1. 
Another system is for opportunistic secure communication 
on a main channel between a sender device and a receiver 
device when an eavesdropper device is listening on an eaves-
US 8,213,616 B2 
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dropper channel. This system includes a physical layer com-
ponent and a higher-than-physical-layer component. The 
physical layer is configured to generate a first key in a first 
generation period and to generate a second key during a 
second generation period. The higher-than-physical-layer 
component is configured to encrypt in a first encryption 
period with the first key and to encrypt in a second encryption 
period with the second key. The physical layer component is 
further configured to generate each of the first and the second 
keys from symbols and coding information that are presented 10 
on the main channel during two different sub-periods con-
tained within the respective generation periods. The two dif-
ferent time periods are distinguished by relative signal quality 
on the main channel and on the eavesdropper channel. 
4 
200 includes devices 110, which are in communication over a 
main channel 210. System 200 also includes a third device 
220, which is capable of listening to (eavesdropping on) 
transmissions on main channel 210, using an eavesdropper 
channel 230. Eavesdropper 220 is passive with respect to 
main channel 210: eavesdropper 220 does not jam main chan-
nel 210, insert bits on main channel 210, etc. 
At the physical layer, both channels can be modeled as 
including noise inputs which affect signal quality: main chan-
nel 210 is affected by noise input 240 and eavesdropper 
channel 230 is affected by noise input 250. One or both of 
devices 110 has information about the signal quality on 
eavesdropper channel 230, and in embodiments where only 
one device 110 has this signal quality information, the infor-
15 mation can be communicated to the other device. The tech-
DETAILED DESCRIPTION niques disclosed herein also allow for the possibility that 
eavesdropper 220 has information about the signal quality on 
main channel 210, but the techniques insure that such infor-
mation is not sufficient to allow eavesdropper 220 to obtain 
Symmetric encryption uses a key to transform a message 
into a form that is unreadable to anyone that does not have the 
key. Since the key itselfis a shared secret, this form of encryp-
tion relies on a method of providing the sender's key to the 
receiver in a secure manner. The systems and methods dis-
closed herein exploit naturally-occurring properties of the 
communication channel itself, at the physical layer, which 
allow the sender and the receiver to generate the same key, 
rather than having the sender transmit the key to the receiver, 
20 key 180. 
Both devices 110 include physical layer opportunistic 
security logic 260. Logic 260 in llOS cooperates with logic 
260 in device 11 OR to provide security at the physical layer in 
an opportunistic manner, by exploiting characteristics of 
25 noisy channels 210, 230 in combination with information 
about relative signal quality of channels 210 and 230. These 
techniques for exploiting channel characteristics will be 
described in further detail after relative signal quality is dis-
as occurs in conventional cryptographic solutions. In some 
embodiments, the distilled key is used by a higher protocol 
layer to encrypt messages, using, for example, standard secret 
key encryption algorithms. In other embodiments, the key 30 
distilled at both sides is used as a one-time pad to provide 
perfect secrecy. 
cussed connection with FIG. 3, 
FIG. 3 is a graph of signal quality on main channel 210 and 
eavesdropper channel 230, over time. As can be seen in FIG. 
3, there are time periods 310 during which signal quality 320 
on main channel 210 is better than signal quality 330 on 
eavesdropper channel 230. In this disclosure, these time peri-
35 ods 310 will be referred to as "reliable" or "secret" time 
FIG. 1 is a block diagram of an environment in which one 
embodiment of a system and method for providing opportu-
nistic security for physical communication channels is 
located. A system 100 includes two devices, llOS and llOR, 
each of which includes a physical layer component 120 and a 
higher layer component 130. At the physical layer, sender 
device llOS uses two different time periods to transmit two 
different kinds of information to receiver device llOR: ran- 40 
periods. There are also periods of time 340 during which the 
converse is true, and message channel signal quality 320 is 
worse than wiretap channel signal quality 330. These time 
periods 340 will be referred to as "unreliable" or "non-secret" 
time periods. Although this behavior is typical of wireless 
channels (where fading causes random fluctuations of the 
signal's amplitude and phase), a person ofordinary skill in the 
art should recognize that the principles described herein 
apply to any physical medium which experiences random 
dom symbols 140 are transmitted during some time periods 
150; and coding information 160 is transmitted during other 
time periods 170. Both sender llOS and receiver llOR then 
use an algorithm to combine coding information 160 with 
random symbols 140 to distill a key 180. 
Once discovered by each side, key 180 is then communi-
cated from physical layer component 120 in each device 110 
45 noise or random fluctuations in signal strength, and thus these 
two different time periods. 
to the corresponding higher layer component 130 in the same 
device 110. After using key 180 to encrypt a message, higher 
layer component 130 in sender device llOS transmits the 
encrypted message 190 to receiver device 11 OR. Higher layer 
component 130 in receiver device llOR uses key 180 to 
decrypt message 190. 
Physical layer opportunistic security logic 260 exploits 
these varying differences in relative signal quality by com-
municating two different types of information from sender 
50 device llOS to receiver device llOR in these two different 
A few examples of higher protocol layer 130 are wired 
equivalent privacy (WEP) at the media access control (MAC) 55 
layer, internet protocol security (IPSec) at the network layer, 
and secure sockets layer (SSL) at the application layer. How-
ever, a person of ordinary skill in the art should understand 
that the key discovery techniques disclosed herein can be 
used by any protocol layer 130 above the physical layer. Such 60 
a person will also understand that although FIG. 1, and other 
figures herein, illustrate example scenarios in which device 
11 OS acts as a sender and device 11 OR acts as a receiver, each 
device is capable of acting as both a transmitter and a receiver. 
The physical layer of the channel between sender device 65 
11 OS and receiver device 11 OR will now be described in more 
detail in connection with the block diagram ofFIG. 2. System 
time periods. During periods 310 in which message channel 
signal quality 3 20 is better than wiretap channel signal quality 
330-i.e., during secret periods-random symbols 140 are 
sent over main channel 210. In the example embodiments 
described herein, logic 260 in sender device llOS transmits 
these random symbols 140. In other embodiments, a fourth 
party (e.g., a broadcast satellite) transmits random symbols 
140. 
During periods 340 in which message channel signal qual-
ity 320 is worse than wiretap channel signal quality 330-i.e., 
during non-secret periods-coding information 160 is sent 
over main channel 210. Thus, there is a correspondence 
between the time periods in FIG. 3 and the time periods in 
FIG. 1: the secret periods 310 in FIG. 3 correspond to trans-
mit-random-symbols periods 160 in FIG. 1, and the non-
secret periods 340 correspond to transmit-coding-informa-
tion periods 170. 
US 8,213,616 B2 
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During good-quality-on-message-channel periods 310, 
receiver device HOR accumulates random symbols 140 but 
does not use the bits represented by the symbols. After coding 
information 160 has been communicated during bad-quality-
on-message-channel periods 340, sender HOS and receiver 
HOR combine this additional coding information 160 with 
the accumulated random symbols 140 to produce key 180 
(see FIG. 1). 
According to the principles of information-theoretic secu-
rity, eavesdropper 220 cannot determine key 180 under these 10 
conditions. Information-theoretic security principles show 
that system 200 has positive secrecy capacity during good-
quality-on-message-channel periods, or reliable periods, 310. 
As will be described in further detail below, sender device 
HOS and receiver device HOR share common randomness 15 
through the random symbols 140 transmitted by sender 
device HOS during reliable periods 310. This transmission 
results in a set of symbols which is correlated between sender 
and receiver. Information-theoretic security principles also 
show that system 200 has zero secrecy capacity during bad- 20 
quality-on-message-channel periods, or unreliable periods, 
340. Coding information 160 is transmitted during unreliable 
periods 340, and receiver device HOR uses this coding infor-
mation 160 to recover the bits represented by already-trans-
mitted random symbols 140. The code is designed to match 25 
the secrecy capacity of a particular system: the strength of the 
code guarantees that legitimate receiver device HOR can 
recover a sequence of bits identical to those of the transmitter. 
Since system 200 has (by definition) zero secrecy capacity 
during unreliable periods 340, it is possible for eavesdropper 30 
220 to obtain some of the information that is transmitted 
6 
reconciliation of correlated sequences. In some embodi-
ments, the number of symbols, the amplitudes of the symbols, 
and the probability distribution of the symbols are all opti-
mized so that information is transmitted at a rate close to 
channel capacity, while still satisfying the power constraint of 
main channel 210. 
Both sender HOS and receiver HOR map (420) the 
received symbols (X and Y respectively) to a bit sequence. 
However, since some amount of noise may be present on main 
channel 210, the bit sequence Q(Y) produced by receiver 
HOR may differ from the bit sequence Q(X) produced by 
sender HOS. That is, bit sequence Q(Y) may contain errors. 
When logic 260 detects that message channel signal qual-
ity 320 is worse than wiretap channel signal quality 330 (i.e., 
during unreliable periods 340), sender HOS generates (430) 
error-correcting (coding) information 160 from the bit 
sequence Q(X), and transmits (440) coding information 160 
over main channel 210. During these unreliable periods 340, 
receiver HOR decodes (4SO) coding information 160 and 
uses this information to recover or reconcile the original bit 
sequence Q(X). In some embodiments, coding information 
160 takes the form of a low-density parity-check code 
(LDPC). In other embodiments, coding information 160 
takes the form of a turbo code. 
After reconciliation, sender HOS communicates (460) a 
random function over main channel 210, and each side 
applies ( 470) that random function to reconciled bit sequence 
Q(X). This application is also known as privacy amplifica-
tion, and the result is secure key 180. In some embodiments, 
this random function is a universal hash function, with the 
property of producing an output sequence that is in general 
much smaller than the input sequence. 
Notably, the reconciliation and privacy amplification steps, 
using coding information 160 already transmitted during a 
during these unreliable periods 340. In fact, information theo-
retic security principles can quantify the maximum amount of 
information learned by eavesdropper 220, regardless of par-
ticular decoding methods which eavesdropper 220 might use. 
However, an additional step (privacy amplification) taken by 
sender HOS and receiver HOR after the reconstruction guar-
antees that eavesdropper 220 can obtain no information from 
the amplified reconstructed bit sequence. Since the amplified 
and reconstructed bit sequence can be used as a key 180 by 
both sides, it follows that the techniques disclosed herein 
allow key 180 to be generated by both sides in a manner that 
precludes eavesdropper 220 from obtaining key 180, and thus 
the techniques provide secure communication. 
35 may be conducted over several disjoint unreliable periods 
340. Furthermore, in some embodiments coding information 
160 is transmitted in some reliable periods 310 as well as 
unreliable periods 340, to ensure some minimum amount of 
time is available for processing random symbols are pro-
40 cessed. 
FIG. 4 is a sequence diagram of one embodiment ofphysi- 45 
cal layer opportunistic security logic 260. Sequence 400 starts 
when logic 260 detects that message channel signal quality 
320 is better than wiretap channel signal quality 330 (i.e., 
during a reliable period 310). A person ofordinary skill in the 
art should be familiar with detection using standard channel 50 
estimation techniques, such as pilot-assisted symbol estima-
tion, etc. During reliable periods 310, sender HOS transmits 
(410) over main channel 210 a series of symbols (X) selected 
at random from a symbol set. In some embodiments, the 
symbols are quadrature amplitude modulation (QAM) sym- 55 
bols. 
FIGS. SA-E are block diagrams illustrating an example 
scenario with sender HOS, receiver HOR, and eavesdropper 
220. Sender HOS and receiver HOR communicate over main 
channel 210, which is subject to noise input 240. Eavesdrop-
per 220 listens on eavesdropper channel 230, which is subject 
to noise input 2SO. 
FIG. SA illustrates the behavior of the parties during reli-
able periods 310. As described earlier, sender HOS transmits 
over main channel 210 a sequence of random symbols 140. In 
this diagram, the symbol waveforms as seen by sender HOS, 
receiver HOR, and eavesdropper 220 are shown as X, Y, and 
Z, respectively, while the sequence of quantized bits detected 
by the three parties are shown as Q(X), Q(Y) and Q(Z), 
respectively. In this example, the originally transmitted bit 
sequence Q(X) is 10110. Since main channel 210 is subject to 
noise, the sequence Q(Y) seen by receiver HOR is slightly 
different: 10101. Since transmission of random symbols 
occurs during reliable periods 310, in which message channel 
signal quality 3 20 is better than wiretap channel signal quality 
After the random symbol transmission 410, sender HOS 
and receiver HOR share a set of correlated continuous-valued 
symbols. Since continuous values are used, extracting a 
sequence of common bits from these continuous sequences is 
not straightforward, and standard coding techniques cannot 
be applied directly. Therefore, the systems and methods dis-
closed herein use multilevel coding. Multilevel coding quan-
tizes the continuous symbols and then assigns a binary label 
to each of the quantized values. Although basic principles of 
multilevel coding have been proposed for use in general com-
munication, here the use of multilevel codes is extended to the 
60 330, the sequence Q(Z) seen by eavesdropper 220 will, on 
average, contain more errors. Here, Q(Z) is 11011, which 
contains three bit errors as compared to two bit errors in Q(Y). 
FIG. SB illustrates the behavior of the parties during unre-
liable periods 340. As described earlier, sender HOS trans-
65 mits coding information 160 which allows receiver HOR to 
reconstruct the original bit sequence Q(X) from the 
received-and possibly errored-bit sequence Q(Y), while 
US 8,213,616 B2 
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also preventing eavesdropper 220 from reconstructing the 
original sequence. In this example, the error correcting code 
is a single parity bit protecting a group of three bits, so the 
transmitted code Cl (SlO) indicates even parity. The first 
three bits in Q(Y) were received by receiver HOR with even 
parity, so no error is detected by receiver HOR and the first 
three bits in Q(Y) remain as is. Eavesdropper 220 also 
receives code Cl, but the bits in Q(Z) contain more errors, 
since wiretap channel signal quality 330 was worse when 
Q(Z) was received. Thus, the first three bits in Q(Z) still 
contain errors, even after code Cl is received. 
The reconciliation phase continues as illustrated in FIG. 
SC. The transmitted code C2 (S20) also indicates even parity. 
Here, the first second bits in Q(Y) were received with odd 
parity, so an error is detected and the second three bits in Q(Y) 
are corrected to 010. The reconciliation phase is completed in 
FIG. SD, where transmitted code C3 (S30) indicates even 
parity, and the last three bits in Q(Y) remain unchanged. As 
before, Q(Z) as seen by eavesdropper 220 still contains errors, 
even after all three codes Cl, C2 and C3 are received. 
The final phase for key generation is illustrated in FIG. SE. 
At the end of the reconciliation function, the bit sequence 
Q(Z) is still correlated with sequence Q(X), which means 
eavesdropper 220 can guess some information about original 
bit sequence Q(X). To amplify the amount of privacy, sender 
HOS broadcasts a random function, which is received by 
receiver HOR and eavesdropper 220. Each party applies the 
random function to Q(X), Q(Y), and Q(Z), respectively. 
Application of the random function by sender HOS and 
receiver HOR produces the same key 180, while eavesdrop-
per 220 produces a different key S40. Information-theoretic 
security principles guarantee that each bit of the eavesdrop-
per-generated key S60 has a particular degree of indepen-
dence from corresponding bits of key 180. That is, the error 
correcting code and the privacy amplification function are 
designed to guarantee that key S40 is as independent of key 
180 as is desired, which means that eavesdropper 220 can 
extract no information about key 180. 
FIG. 6 is a block diagram of the multilevel coder and 
encoder used by some embodiments of physical layer oppor-
tunistic security logic 260. As described earlier, noise channel 
240 introduces discrepancies between the received data as 
seen by receiver HOR and the random symbols sent by sender 
HOS. Sender HOS generates reconciliation, or coding, infor-
mation 160 to correct these discrepancies. Logic 260 within 
sender device HOS includes a bit labeler 610 which receives 
transmitted symbols X and assigns an m-bit binary label to 
each symbol X. A multilevel coder 620 (e.g., a LDPC coder) 
successively computes a series of m syndromes s. Syndromes 
s are transmitted on main channel 210 during reliable periods 
310. 
Logic 260 within receiver device HOR recovers syn-
dromes s. Random symbols Y (previously received during 
unreliable periods 340) are processed by a demapper 630 to 
produce a bit sequence which, in combination with syn-
dromes s, is decoded by a multistage decoder 640. Thus, 
decoder 640 uses syndromes s as side information. 
FIG. 7 is a diagram illustrating a timeline 700 for generat-
ing and using multiple keys over time. A time period 710 in 
which a first key is generated is followed by another time 
period 720 in which the first key is used for encryption. A 
second key is generated in time period 730, and this second 
key is used during time period 740. Similarly, a third key is 
generatedin time period 7SO, and this third key is used during 
time period 760. As explained earlier, each of key generation 
periods 710, 730, 7SO is itself composed of reliable sub-
periods during which random symbols are distributed and 
8 
unreliable sub-periods during which reconciliation occurs. In 
this manner, key 180 is periodically refreshed, so that even if 
eavesdropper 220 guesses one instance of the key, that key 
instance is in use for only a short period of time. 
In some embodiments, the frequency of key generation is 
based on characteristics of main channel 210, eavesdropper 
channel 230, or both (e.g., the ratio ofreliable periods 310 to 
unreliable periods 340, the ratio of average main channel 
signal quality to average eavesdropper channel signal quality, 
10 or the absolute signal quality of either channel). In some 
embodiments, physical layer component 120 (see FIG. 1) 
generates the key in response to a request by higher-layer 
component 130. In other embodiments, physical layer com-
ponent 120 generates the key of its own accord, without a 
15 request by higher-layer component 130. 
FIG. 8 is a hardware block diagram of device HO in accor-
dance with one embodiment of the systems and methods of 
providing opportunistic security for physical communication 
channels. Device HO contains a number of components that 
20 are well known in the art of data communications, including 
a processor 810, a network interface 820, memory 830, and 
non-volatile storage 840. These components are coupled via 
bus 18SO. A person of ordinary skill in the art should under-
stand that the network interface 820 may support different 
25 medias, speeds, etc. Examples of non-volatile storage 
include, for example, a hard disk, flash RAM, flash ROM, 
EEPROM, etc. Memory 830 contains physical layer oppor-
tunistic security logic 260 from FIG. 1, which programs or 
enables processor 810 to perform the functions oflogic 260. 
30 Omitted from FIG. 8 are a number of conventional compo-
nents, known to those skilled in the art, that are not necessary 
to explain the operation of device HO. 
Device HO can be implemented in software, hardware, or 
a combination thereof. In some embodiments, the device, 
35 system, and/or method is implemented in software that is 
stored in a memory and that is executed by a suitable micro-
processor, network processor, or microcontroller situated in a 
computing device. In other embodiments, the device, system 
and/or method is implemented in hardware, including, but not 
40 limited to, a programmable logic device (PLD), program-
mable gate array (PGA), field programmable gate array 
(FPGA), an application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC), a 
system on chip (SoC), and a system on packet (SoP). 
Device HO can be embodied in any computer-readable 
45 medium for use by or in connection with an instruction execu-
tion system, apparatus, or device. Such instruction execution 
systems include any computer-based system, processor-con-
taining system, or other system that can fetch and execute the 
instructions from the instruction execution system. In the 
50 context of this disclosure, a "computer-readable medium" 
can be any means that can contain, store, communicate, 
propagate, or transport the program for use by, or in connec-
tion with, the instruction execution system. The computer 
readable medium can be, for example but not limited to, a 
55 system or propagation medium that is based on electronic, 
magnetic, optical, electromagnetic, infrared, or semiconduc-
tor technology. 
Specific examples of a computer-readable medium using 
electronic technology would include (but are not limited to) 
60 the following: an electrical connection (electronic) having 
one or more wires; a random access memory (RAM); a read-
only memory (ROM); an erasable programmable read-only 
memory (EPROM or Flash memory). A specific example 
using magnetic technology includes (but is not limited to) a 
65 portable computer diskette. Specific examples using optical 
technology include (but are not limited to) an optical fiber and 
a portable compact disk read-only memory (CD-ROM). 
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Any process descriptions or blocks in flowcharts should be 
understood as representing modules, segments, or portions of 
code which include one or more executable instructions for 
implementing specific logical functions or steps in the pro-
cess. As would be understood by those of ordinary skill in the 
art of the software development, alternate implementations 
are also included within the scope of the disclosure. In these 
alternate implementations, functions may be executed out of 
order from that shown or discussed, including substantially 
concurrently or in reverse order, depending on the function- 10 
ality involved. 
The foregoing description has been presented for purposes 
of illustration and description. It is not intended to be exhaus-
tive or to limit the disclosure to the precise forms disclosed. 
Obvious modifications or variations are possible in light of 15 
the above teachings. The implementations discussed, how-
ever, were chosen and described to illustrate the principles of 
the disclosure and its practical application to thereby enable 
one of ordinary skill in the art to utilize the disclosure in 
various implementations and with various modifications as 20 
are suited to the particular use contemplated. All such modi-
fications and variation are within the scope of the disclosure 
as determined by the appended claims when interpreted in 
accordance with the breadth to which they are fairly and 
legally entitled. 25 
We claim: 
1. A method for opportunistic secure communication on a 
main charmel between a sender device and a receiver device 
when an eavesdropper device is listening on an eavesdropper 30 
channel, the method comprising: 
transmitting, in a first time period in which signal quality 
on the main charmel is better than signal quality on the 
eavesdropper channel, symbols that are randomly 
selected from a set of symbols; 35 
transmitting, in a second time period in which signal qual-
ity on the main channel is not better than signal quality 
on the eavesdropper channel, coding information asso-
ciated with the randomly selected symbols; 
reconciling the randomly selected symbols using the cod- 40 
ing information; 
determining when signal quality on the main channel is 
better than signal quality on the eavesdropper channel; 
responsive to the determination, transmitting the symbols 
that are randomly selected from a set of symbols; 45 
determining when signal quality on the main charmel is not 
better than signal quality on the eavesdropper charmel; 
and 
10 
applying a universal hash function to the reconciled bit 
sequence to distill a secure key. 
6. The system of claim 1, further comprising: 
generating the coding information for transmission in the 
second time period with a multilevel code. 
7. The system of claim 1, further comprising: 
mapping the randomly selected symbols to a bit sequence; 
and 
generating the coding information for transmission in the 
second time period from the bit sequence. 
8. The system of claim 1, wherein the means for reconcil-
ing the randomly selected symbols using the coding informa-
tion produces a reconciled bit sequence, the system further 
comprising: 
applying a universal hash function to the reconciled bit 
sequence to distill a secure key. 
9. The method of claim 1, further comprising: 
producing the secure key by applying the universal hash 
function to the reconciled bit sequence. 
10. The method of claim 1, wherein the coding information 
comprises error-correcting information. 
11. The method of claim 1, wherein the coding information 
comprises at least one parity bit. 
12. A system of opportunistic secure communication on a 
main charmel between a sender device and a receiver device 
when an eavesdropper device is listening on an eavesdropper 
channel, the system comprising: 
transmitting, in a first time period in which signal quality 
on the main channel is better than signal quality on the 
eavesdropper channel, symbols that are randomly 
selected from a set of symbols; 
transmitting, in a second time period in which signal qual-
ity on the main channel is not better than signal quality 
on the eavesdropper charmel, coding information asso-
ciated with the randomly selected symbols; 
reconciling the randomly selected symbols using the cod-
ing information; 
determining when signal quality on the main charmel is 
better than signal quality on the eavesdropper charmel; 
responsive to the determination, transmitting the symbols 
that are randomly selected from a set of symbols; 
determining when signal quality on the main channel is not 
better than signal quality on the eavesdropper charmel; 
and 
responsive to the determination, transmitting the coding 
information associated with the randomly selected sym-
bols. 
responsive to the determination, transmitting the coding 13. A method for opportunistic secure communication on a 
information associated with the randomly selected sym- 50 main charmel between a sender device and a receiver device 
bols. when an eavesdropper device is listening on an eavesdropper 
2. The method of claim 1, further comprising: channel, the method comprising: 
generating the coding information for transmission in the transmitting, in a first time period, symbols that are ran-
second time period with a multilevel code. domly selected from a set of symbols; 
3. The method of claim 1, further comprising: 55 transmitting, in a second time period, coding information 
generating the coding information for transmission in the associated with the randomly selected symbols; 
second time period with a low-density parity-check reconciling the randomly selected symbols using the cod-
(LDPC) code. ing information, wherein the first and second time peri-
4. The method of claim 1, further comprising: ods are distinguished by relative signal quality on the 
mapping the randomly selected symbols to a bit sequence; 60 main channel and on the eavesdropper charmel; 
and determining when signal quality on the main charmel is 
generating the coding information for transmission in the better than signal quality on the eavesdropper charmel; 
second time period from the bit sequence. responsive to the determination, transmitting the symbols 
5. The method of claim 1, wherein reconciling the ran- that are randomly selected from a set of symbols; 
domly selected symbols using the coding information pro- 65 determining when signal quality on the main channel is not 
duces a reconciled bit sequence, the method further compris- better than signal quality on the eavesdropper charmel; 
~: and 
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responsive to the determination, transmitting the coding 
information associated with the randomly selected sym-
bols. 
14. The method of claim 13, further comprising: 
generating the coding information for transmission in the 
second time period with a multilevel code. 
15. The method of claim 13, further comprising: 
mapping the randomly selected symbols to a bit sequence; 
and 
generating the coding information for transmission in the 10 
second time period from the bit sequence. 
16. The method of claim 13, wherein reconciling the ran-
domly selected symbols using the coding information pro-
~uces a reconciled bit sequence, the method further compris-
mg: 15 
applying a universal hash function to the reconciled bit 
sequence to distill a secure key. 
17. The method of claim 13, wherein reconciling the ran-
domly selected symbols using the coding information pro-
~uces a reconciled bit sequence, the method further compris- 20 
mg: 
applying a universal hash function to the reconciled bit 
sequence to distill a secure key. 
18. A system for opportunistic secure communication on a 
main chamiel between a sender device and a receiver device 
25 
when an eavesdropper device is listening on an eavesdropper 
channel, the system comprising: 
a physical layer component configured to distill a key from 
symbols and coding information that are presented on 
the m~in channel during two different time periods, the 30 
two different time periods distinguished by relative sig-
nal quality on the main channel and on the eavesdropper 
channel; 
12 
generating the coding information with a low-density par-
ity-check (LDPC) code. 
20. The system of claim 18, wherein the higher-than-physi-
cal layer component is further configured to request the physi-
cal layer component to distill the key. 
21. A system for opportunistic secure communication on a 
main chamiel between a sender device and a receiver device 
when an eavesdropper device is listening on an eavesdropper 
channel, the system comprising: 
a physical layer component configured to generate a first 
key in a first generation period and to generate a second 
key during a second generation period; 
a higher-than-physical-layer component configured to 
encrypt in a first encryption period with the first key and 
to encrypt in a second encryption period with the second 
key, 
wherein the physical layer component is further configured 
to generate each of the first and the second keys from 
symbols and coding information that are presented on 
the main channel during two different sub-periods con-
tained within the respective generation periods, the two 
different sub-periods distinguished by relative signal 
quality on the main chamiel and on the eavesdropper 
channel; 
transmit, in the first sub-period, symbols that are randomly 
selected from a set of symbols; 
transmit, in the second sub-period, coding information 
associated with the randomly selected symbols; and 
reconcile the randomly selected symbols using the coding 
information. 
22. The system of claim 21, wherein the higher-than-physi-
cal layer component is further configured to request the physi-
cal layer component to generate the first key. 
23. The system of claim 21, wherein the higher-than-physi-
a higher-than-physical-layer component configured to 
encrypt a message using the distilled key; 
transmitting, in the first time period, symbols that are ran-
domly selected from a set of symbols; 
35 cal layer component is further configured to request the physi-
cal layer component to generate the first key, wherein fre-
quency of the request is based on characteristics of the main 
channel. 
transmitting, in the second time period, coding information 
associated with the randomly selected symbols; and 
reconciling the randomly selected symbols using the cod-
40 
ing information. 
19. The system of claim 18, wherein the physical layer 
component is further configured to: 
24. The system of claim 21, wherein the physical layer 
c~mponent is further configured to generate the first key 
without a request from the higher-than-layer physical com-
ponent. 
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